We propose a generic strategic network resource sharing game between a set of players representing operators. The players negotiate which sets of players share given resources, serving users with varying sensitivity to interference. We prove that the proposed game has a Nash equilibrium, to which a greedily played game converges. Furthermore, simulation results show that, when applied to interoperator spectrum sharing in small-cell indoor office environment, the convergence is fast and there is a significant performance improvement for the operators when compared to the default resource usage configuration.
I. Introduction
Game theory has been widely used in analyzing and designing wireless network protocols.
Often, game theoretical principles have been used as guiding light when striving for distributed solutions of NP-hard optimization problems. The idea is that if in a given networking situation, a
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power allocation problems addressed in [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] by the status of the players of the game. In physical layer settings, such as power allocation, game theory acts as an inspiration to designing distributed algorithms. These algorithms would be implemented in hardware, and typically there would be a standard governing the implementation. Conformance tests would then apply to the hardware, and the hardware entities would have no independent rationality allowing generic change of strategy. Mechanism design [12] would then lead to hardware implementation.
A good example of this is [7] , where a fully distributed, almost socially optimal algorithm based on a mechanism obeyed by all resource allocation players was presented.
In the multioperator spectrum sharing problem, the players are instead entities with full freedom of action. Decisions on which set of carriers is used for communication, are taken by truly economic actors, or by software implementations governed by such actors. In such settings, mechanism design would take the form of designing protocols that enable socially beneficial behavior, which are enforced either by law, or by legally binding agreements.
In [13] , [14] , we have investigated mechanisms defined by coordination protocols determining allowed sets of actions of players participating in network resource allocation games, where there is interference between the networks, when they use the same resource. A mechanism based on instantaneous reciprocity was discussed in [13] . Scenarios of mutual renting, where each player has a private resource, and a resource pool, where each player has equal right to access resources, were addressed. It was shown that a protocol where resources are divided by the individual players and the set of all players has a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. Players are willing to sacrifice some of their right to use resources, if all others do the same. This concept differs from reciprocal altruism, studied in [15] . According to [15] , reciprocal altruism emerges in indefinitely repeated strategic games. Strategies incentivizing socially optimal behavior based on reciprocation and forgiveness can be found. In [13] , reciprocity is instantaneous and dictated by the mechanism.
In this paper we study a general strategic resource allocation game between N competing parties. There is a network resource utilization pattern, determining which players use which resource. There is interaction between the players when they use the same resources-we assume that the utility function of individual players are concave in these patterns. The mechanism enforced by a coordination protocol is based on instantaneous reciprocity, but differing from [13] , any subset of players may reach agreement about reciprocal resources usage, and any number of such subsets may have simultaneous agreements. We thus have a reciprocal resource partitioning game in the the power set of the users. The motivation of the problem setting is that the players would be serving multiple users, and accordingly, there are varying degrees of conflict between resource usage, depending on the amount of resources shared with different subsets of other players. This leads to preferences to play with multiple different subsets.
Despite the fact that the problem of finding subsets of players with similar interest, the considered game is not a coalition formation game. 1 A generic player may prefer to be part of multiple coalitions, and have a preference for the distribution of resources between these coalitions. The utilities of the players are fully non-transferable, and the games are N-player strategic games. Coalition formation and bargaining games may be developed based on the strategic games considered here. This, however, is left for future work.
In the considered powerset resource sharing games, we prove existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, and provide a sequential resolution scheme where best response greedy bidding is proven to converge to a Nash Equilibrium.
As an example we consider a realization of the game related to spectrum sharing between operators. We show that if the operators apply an α-fair sum-utility function [17] , the operator utility function is concave in the network resource utilization pattern, and thus the NE results proven for the generic game apply. We provide simulation results for a game played between N = 4 operators in a small-cell indoor office environment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. The network resource sharing problem is formulated as an N-person game in Section III. The existence of equilibrium point is shown in Section IV. In Section V, a sequential N-person game is discussed where the players have a greedy strategy and shown to converge. Section VI discusses inter-operator spectrum sharing as an application example. Section VII provides simulation results and analysis.
Section VIII draws conclusions.
II. System model
There are N players, given by a set N, who are negotiating about one unit of a shared resource.
The resource is divided into 2 N parts, one part b S for each subset S ⊂ N. We say that the fraction b S is allocated to the subset S. The resource b S is non-orthogonally shared by the players who are a member of the subset S. We have
Under the natural assumption that no part of the resource is left completely unused, we have
The default usage pattern of the shared resource is determined, for example, by a regulatory body or by previous negotiations. The two most interesting cases are the mutual renting game (MRG), where
for all S ⊂ N, meaning that all resources are private by default, and the resource pool game (RPG), where
for all S ⊂ N., meaning that all resources are unlicensed by default or all the players has a right to use the shared resource. In MRG, we assume without loss of generality that all players have the same amount of resource to start with.
For a given resource usage pattern b ∈ {R + } 2 N , the players get a utility of g n (b) for all n ∈ N.
We assume that each function g n is strictly concave and differentiable in b. We will verify in Section VI that this assumption is valid and natural in a wide variety of network problems, where each player is serving several users, and her payoff is an alpha-fair summation of the experience of these users. There are precisely 2 N−1 subsets S ⊂ N such that n ∈ S , and we denote the collection of these sets by P n . The utility g n (b) is assumed to depend only on {b S : S ∈ P n } changes only when the value of b S such that S ∈ P n varies. Consider two resource utilization patterns b 1 , b 2 and two subsets S ∈ P n andS ⊂ N.
− , and > 0. We have the following order relationship
In terms of network games we interpret this as follows: The players' utility functions are increasing in the experience of their users, and this experience increases the less interference is experienced from other players. Note that this holds also ifS P n , as then g n (b 2 ) = g n (b 0 ). 6 The players negotiate to determine a resource usage pattern b that is valid for a given period called resource sharing period. The objective of the players is to maximize their utility function g n . In Section III, we define a game that serves as a formalism for these negotiations.
III. Problem formulation as N-person game
The resource sharing problem is formulated as an N-person game. The game is denoted as
The strategy of a player, a n ∈ {R ∪ * } 2 N will be interpreted as the values of b S that are prefered by player n. Here, a nS = * is interpreted as n not having an opinion about the resources assigned to set S , which will be applicable when n S . A joint strategy of all players will therefore be a matrix in {R ∪ * } 2 N ·N , where half the entries take the void value * . The payoff of a player, Φ n (a) ∈ R + , is given as the utility of the player with the agreed resource usage pattern. The game is determined by two things: an instantaneous reciprocity and the a priori rule a → b to determine the outcome of the negotiations. Hence, after defining an outcome b = Υ(a) ∈ {R} 2 N as a function of the strategies (henceforth bids) a, we can define the payoff function Φ n as
A. Instantaneous reciprocity
The strategy of a player in a given resource sharing period does not depend on the outcome of the games in the past or future spectrum sharing periods. Since the players are assumed to be selfish, there has to be an instantaneous reciprocity. In particular, we have the constraint
that ensures that all players give and take the same amount of favor. Here, in MRG, a favor is to give right to use on a resource. In RPG, a favor is to remain silent on a resource. A favor given by a player is divided among the players using it.
We hence define the set F of feasible sharing patters by
Hence, F is a convex polytope defined by 2 N inequalities and N equalities. Note that the distinction between MRG and RPG is not observed in the set of feasible resource sharing patterns, but only in the default sharing pattern, and hence in the resolution rule, which is defined in Section III-C.
B. Strategy space
Let A n be the strategy space of player n, meaning the set of allowed bids. We define A as the subspace A n ⊂ {R ∪ * } 2 N given by the constraints
which is a compact convex set. This means that a n has to respect the instantaneous reciprocity constraint (6). Moreover, if n S , then we require a nS to take the void value * , which should be interpreted as not having any prefered value of b S . This is natural to require, to not allow players to obstruct an agreement that does not affect her payoff, between a set of players in which she is not a member.
C. An a-priori resolution rule
The game has an a-priori agreed rule to resolve the strategies of the players. Denote the resolution rule by
mapping the joint strategy of the players {a n } n∈N to the resource allocation b ∈ R 2 N . The resolution rule Υ will also depend on a default resource distribution b 0 ∈ F , as described in Section II. We also propose a sequential game, where the outcome of one round will be the default distribution of the next. This is only one of the reasons why we allow arbitrary b 0 ∈ F .
For a bid a n ∈ (R ∪ * ) 2 N , define the set
Requiring the outcome {b S : n ∈ S } to remain within I n , we guarantee that no player has to change her default usage pattern more than she is willing to according to her bid. We propose the following resolution rule:
Observe that, while in general the maximum might not be unique, it will be almost surely, assuming the bids are drawn from a continuous probability distribution. This will in turn happen if the players play optimally, and the players' utility functions g n are generic enough. We may also observe that, while it is in general computationally unfeasible to find the largest vector in a given set, the resolution rule can be evaluated efficiently, thanks to the following lemma.
Theorem 1:
The resolution rule Υ is the solution of a linear optimization problem.
Proof: The proof is easy but technical, and is postponed to Appendix A.
IV. Existence of equilibrium point
We will begin by stating and proving a standard game theoretic lemma in a version that suits our settings. For game-theoretic terminology, we refer to [18] , and for topological notions we refer to [19] .
Lemma 1: Let (N, A, Φ) be an N-player game that satisfies the following three criteria:
1) The payoff function Φ is upper semicontinuous.
2) The joint strategy space A is convex and compact.
3) For each player n ∈ N, and all joint strategies a −n = {a iS : i n}, the set
is convex.
Then (N, A, Φ) has a Nash equilibrium point.
Proof: Let P(A) be the set of all subspaces of A. Consider the set valued map ∇ : A → P(A), given by ∇(a) = n γ n (a −n ). By upper semicontinuity of Φ, γ n is closed, and by assumption (3) it is also convex. As ∇(a) is a product of finitely many compact convex sets, it is itself compact and convex. It also follows from upper semicontinuity of Φ that the ∇ is upper hemicontinuous.
Now by Kakutani's theorem [20] , any function X → P(X) on a compact domain X, that is upper-hemicontinuous and takes closed and convex values, has a fixed point. Hence, there exists a ∈ A such that a ∈ ∇(a) = n γ n (a −n ). This means that a n ∈ γ n (a −n ) for every n, which in turn means that no player can improve her outcome by changing her bid. Hence, a is a Nash equilibrium.
We now show that 1 applies to the game described in Section III.
Theorem 2: The game
described in Section III has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: The payoff function Φ is upper semicontinuous by definition. 2 The joint strategy space A = n∈N A n is a product of finitely many compact spaces, and is therefore compact in its own right. To apply Theorem 1, we need to consider the sets
for fixed a and n. This is the set of points a n such that Υ({a i } i∈N ) maximizes g n over all
By strict concavity of g n , it is maximized in a unique point c ∈ F n , where
Now γ n can be written as
But this set is given by the inequalities
S < c S < min{a iS : i n}. As this set is clearly convex, Lemma 1 can be applied, so the game has a Nash equilibrium. 2 To be precise, this is only true when we have defined a tiebreak in the points where the function Υ is not uniquely defined. This is a mere technicality as such situations will almost never occur in practice. We can extend the function Φ to these points, upper semicontinuously for all players.
V. Sequential N-person game
In section IV, the N-person game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium point. However, the Nash equilibrium point is not unique unless we have a n = a n for all n, n ∈ N. Indeed, as long as any player has bids a nS b S , a nT b T that are not equal to the game outcome, then sufficiently small changes can be made to a nS and a nT while respecting the instantaneous resiprocity rule, without changing the outcome of the game. The number of equilibrium points is therefore infinite in the typical case when the Nash equilibrium is not unique.
Since the players are selfish, they prefer a resource usage pattern that maximizes their utility function. It is therefore natural to define their greedy strategy by a n = argmax a g n (a) subject to a ∈ A n (10) for all n ∈ N, with a nS = * if n S . The point (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N ) is not a Nash-equilibrium point unless a n = Υ({a n } n∈N ) for at least N − 1 players. The players, thus, may further want to play a N-person game with updated b 0 ← Υ({a n } n∈N ). This naturally leads to a sequence of games where the default spectrum utilization pattern is updated at each iteration as summarized in algorithm 1. Each player n ∈ N evaluates A n using (8) 5:
Each player n ∈ N obtains a n ∈ A n using (10) 6: n ). In each iteration, at least one new bid a nS gets satisfied, in the sense that a nS = b S . After this happened, the value of b S will not change again, since player n would obstruct such a change. Therefore, the sequence domains of (9) forms a decreasing sequence of polytopes of strictly decreasing dimension. Thus, the sequence converges to a point, to which therefore also the outcomes b converge.
If N = 2, it can be observed that the sequential game converges in one iteration leading to a one-shot game. This is due to the reason that at the first iteration, the strategy of one of the players is selected, i.e. ∃n | a n = Υ({a i n } n∈N ), leading to the maximum possible payoff improvement for the player. Thus, there is no reason for the player to change the agreed resource utilization pattern.
Lemma 2:
The sequential 2-person game converges in one iteration. The strategy of the players is dominant. At least one of the players has a strongly dominant strategy. for all a ∈ A 1 and Φ 2 (a) ≥ Φ 2 (a ) for all a ∈ A 2 . The inequality in the latter case is tight for a ∈ A 2 | a 2N > a 1N . Thus, player 1 has a strongly dominant strategy while the strategy for player 2 is weakly dominant. a 1N > a 2N . Thus, player 1 gets the maximum payoff and the game converges. Similarly, Φ 1 (a) > Φ 1 (a ) for all a ∈ A 1 and Φ 2 (a) ≥ Φ 2 (a ) for all a ∈ A 2 . The inequality in the latter case is tight for a ∈ A 2 | a 2N < a 1N . Therefore, player 1 has a strongly dominant strategy while the strategy for player 2 is weakly dominant.
If a 1 = a 2 , both players get a maximum payoff. The game converges. The strategy of both players is strongly dominant.
For N ≥ 3, we propose an alternative game, with faster convergence, although towards a suboptimal point. Here, the game is played between the players in a subset S ⊆ N, and the dimension is reduced by only negotiating the parameters b {n} , n ∈ S and b S . Now, the strategy of a player becomes a n = arg max a g n (a) subject to a ∈ A nS
where
However, the players need to have an a priori agreed rule on how to choose the sequence of the subsets. With this approach, the players may play a sequence of single dimensional games as summarized in Algorithm 2. P = P where P is the power set of N
5:
while P ∅ do
Agree on a subset S ∈ P
7:
Each player n ∈ N evaluates A nS using (12).
8:
Each player n ∈ N finds a n ∈ A n using (11).
9:
10:
P ← P \ S Proof: Define Φ(a) = n∈N Φ n (a). The utility of a player g n (a) is concave along the line b 0 + t(a n − b 0 ), t ∈ [0, 1] with the optimal value obtained at t = 1. Thus, for any outcome of the resolution rule and iteration i, we have Φ n (a i ) ≥ Φ n (a i−1 ) for all n ∈ N. If b
, there are at least two players such that the inequality is not tight. Therefore, we have
as long as b
Υ(a i ). The sequential N-person game must converge since Φ(a) is bounded from above.
Note that if the players play only a single dimensional sequential game along b n , n ∈ N and b N , the strategy of the players becomes dominant with at least one of the players having a strongly dominant strategy. This can be proven using the same technique as the proof for lemma 2.
VI. Applications: inter-operator resource sharing
The N-person game can be applied for inter-operator resource sharing. A player would now become an operator which typically serves multiple users. Let player n ∈ N has multiple transmitters denoted by a set V n . Each transmitter v ∈ V n may serve multiple users given by U nv . We have U n = ∪ v∈V n U nv . For simplicity, we assume that each transmitter and user has a single antenna.
A player allocates the resources it has to its user. We can assume the resource of a player is infinitely divisible from practicality perspective. Thus for each S n and each u ∈ U n player n gives a fraction w uS of b S to u. The user now has "rate"
where µ uS is the "spectral efficiency" of user u in the resource that is shared by the players in the subset S. The spectral efficiency of a user is given as
where The utility of a player is given as the sum of the utility of its users. The utility of a player depends on the resource that are allocated to the user. A player allocated its resource to its users such that its utility is maximized
where where f (r) is a suitable concave utility function, e.g. α-fair and W is a U n × |P n | resource allocation matrix. We assume each player independently chooses the parameter α for its utility function.
Proposition 1:
The function g n (b) is concave in b if player n applies an α-PF scheduling algorithm to optimize W.
Let W n denotes the set of points W satisfying the constraints of (16) . It is closed and convex.
The domain of g n (b) can be expressed as Dom(g n (b)) = {b | (b, W) ∈ Dom(g n )} for some
Due to the use of an α-PF scheduling algorithm, h n (b, W) is jointly concave function in (b, W).
Let us apply Jensen's inequality on points b 1 , b 2 ∈ Dom(g n ), e.g. as in [21, p. 88] . For > 0, there are some
This holds for any > 0. Therefore, we have
which completes the proof 3 .
Proposition 1 indicates that the utility of the player is concave in the resource utilization pattern b. Note that the concavity is strict if α > 0 and g n is differentiable. Therefore, the Nperson game can be applied for inter-operator resource sharing if the operators apply an α-fair scheduler. The operators do not need to apply the same parameter α for their schedulers. 3 This holds also if a player applies multi-point cooperative transmission to serve its users. The proof for this case is discussed in Appendix B. 15 
VII. Numerical results
The performance of MRG and RPG is evaluated using inter-operator resource sharing. The operators serve users that are located in indoor office/residential environment. The layout and channel models are applied from WINNER-II model for scenario A1, i.e. indoor office [22] , see Figure 1 . We consider only the distance dependent pathloss and the fast fading component of the channel. There are two assumptions for the wall loss in scenario A1. We take the wall loss values for thick wall. 
A. Two-players game
Let TXs 1 and 3 belong to player 1 and TXs 2 and 4 to player 2. The number of users per TX is generated using Poisson distribution with mean 5. If the probability of a user visiting the other operator's TX is 0.5, the location of the users is randomly generated with the whole floor.
If the visiting probability is zero, the location of the users is distributed in a 50x25 rectangle is that keeping resources orthogonalized is almost optimal when there is strong inter-operator interference (comparing to intra-operator interference plus background noise/interference) and re-using resources is close to optimal when there is negligible inter-operator interference. Due to this, the operators may consider the users which has small inter-operator interference in the MRG case and strong inter-operator interference in RPG.
B. Four-players game
Let TX n belongs to player n where n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The number of users per TX is generated using Poisson distribution with mean 5. The location of the users is generated in a similar manner as in the two-players game. The simulation results are averaged over 50 user number and location realizations each with 10 fast fading realizations. 
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a game for resource allocation between operators, who are allowed to form several coalitions simultaneously. The game was proven to have a Nash equilibrium, via geometric methods. When the game is played sequentially between greedy players, it was shown that the outcome converges, and even converges fast in a given example setting. Moreover, in our simulated setting, the outcome appears to be close to a Pareto-optimal distribution, as selected by a centralized coordinator. Further research is needed to prove (near)
Pareto-optimality as well as to study the game with transparent and transferable utilities.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: The setF
over which the maximal is taken, is the intersection of a convex polytope F with convex polyhedra. Hence, it is a convex polytope in its own right. To prove that the objective function
is linear on the feasible set, we rewrite it as
By the definition of I n , we see that if a nS −b 
onF Hence we have
onF . This proves the theorem.
Appendix B: CoMP scheduler
In Section VI, it is shown that the utility of the operators is concave function in the resource utilization pattern assuming there is no cooperative transmission among the transmitters. In this appendix, we show that the result hold also if the transmitters of a player apply cooperative multi-point transmission (CoMP).
Assume the transmitters of an operator have a centralized scheduler. The transmitters can cooperatively serve the users in C n ways where C n = min(U n ,V n ) k=1
Section VI that U n denotes the number of users of operator n and V n denotes its number of transmitters.
With this setting, the spectral efficiency of a user depends on the set of users with whom it is scheduler. The inter-operator interference is, however, colored unless the operator apply a unitary precoder, see e.g. [13] . If the interference is colored, the operator might be assumed to estimate the inter-operator interference based on expected values. With this assumption, let µ ucS denote the spectral efficiency of user u when the transmitters cooperatively serve the users in user group C c ⊆ U n where c ∈ {1, . . . , C n }. Note that µ ucS = 0 if user u is not a member of the user group C c .
Thus, the rate of a user becomes
w ucS µ ucS (19) where w ucS the resource allocated to user group c from the resource b S . Now, the resource allocation matrix W is a U n × C n × |P n | matrix. The utility of a player becomes g n (b) = sup 
Observe that the utility of a player is a jointly concave function in b and W if it uses an α-fair scheduler. The same technique as the proof for Proposition 1 can be used to prove that g n is a concave function in b.
Appendix C: Centralized Scheduler
In the Section VII, we included the result for centralized scheduler which determines the spectrum utilization patter for the operators such that the sum of the utilities of the players 4 is maximized. The sum utility can be maximized such that the instantaneous reciprocity is fulfilled as b * = argmax 
Such a scheduler is especially beneficial if the operators have a symmetric load.
Note that the objective function of both (21) and (22) is concave function as it is a sum of concave functions. The centralized scheduler may also need to know the spectral efficiencies of the users of the operators in order to obtain the utility function of the players as a function resource utilization pattern and solve the problem.
